as district magnitude increases the

Login failed. H2, the main effect of district magnitude). More specifically, we should expect voters in open list systems to be more likely to remember a candidate than in closed list systems. The main result of the article is an interaction effect between district magnitude and list type on CR; under closed list systems without choice over candidates, larger districts are associated with more candidate name recognition. 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Respondents from districts of larger district magnitudes are less likely to mention the same names than respondents from smaller districts, in open list systems only. This article tied the personal vote-seeking attempts of politicians more closely to the personal voting response, by analysing information processing. One Member or Many? Table 3. H2 (district magnitude). The left panel of Figure 5 provides fitted probabilities for respondents not being able to identify a single candidate name. The results from these robustness checks confirm the results discussed in this article and can be found in Tables 8 and 9 in the Appendix 1. A dummy open is one for countries where voters have the option to extend a personal preference for one or more particular candidate(s). Only in open list systems where intra-party competition increases with district magnitude might candidates influence their own electoral prospects by drawing out personal votes. Non-voters, in contrast, seem to be overwhelmed with candidate-specific information and become less likely to recognise a candidate in open list systems only. Please read and accept the terms and conditions and check the box to generate a sharing link. Cox (2007) suggests that as district magnitude increases, the proportion of voters who behave strategically decreases, while the proportion who votes sincerely for their most preferred party For democracies to function properly, knowledgeable voters should collect information about their representatives and hold them accountable at elections. This result is in line with predictions from the personal vote literature (Carey and Shugart, 1995) if CR is driven by heuristics and short-term information processing (Shugart et al., 2005), in response to increased intra-party competition and a differentially focused campaign (Bowler and Farrell, 2011). Education and income are measured on a scale of 8-points and 5-points, respectively, and will be interacted with election dummies in the analysis, to account for potential different measurement procedures across countries. Electoral systems with some choice over candidates within parties (open list systems) incentivise politicians to target voters individually and draw out the personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Crisp et al., 2004; Hallerberg and Marier, 2004). This is particularly clear in the case of non-voters (full lines). District magnitude varies across list type, but the mean and range of district magnitude are similar across both types of lists (see Table 2 in the Appendix 1). Direct measure of congruence between representatives and voter preferences, Analyze relationship between congruence and district magnitude, Lower congruence of individual legislators in larger electoral districts, However, higher congruence of majority of legislators in larger districts, Evidence for existence of a law of large numbers in political representation. Table 7. For some countries, the candidate names remembered by the respondents were reported and coded even if they were incorrect. FundingThe author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. a minister) runs, as well as the overall number of candidates, increases (H2). District magnitude + 1, determines the number of candidates that can run a viable race in a district (make sure to mention validity based off of strategic desertion) What is the only rule in political science? Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of predicted probabilities from an estimation that allows for a differential effect of district magnitude and list type for voters and non-voters (the results from a regression including this three-way interaction can be found in Table 4 in the Appendix 1). Unlike the other models, the multilevel model is fitted to unweighted data. Comparing the results of the multilevel models (columns 3 and 4) to the baseline results (columns 1 and 2) confirms the conclusion drawn with respect to district magnitude and list type. Another way of modelling the clustered information is to estimate a multilevel model and account for clustering at the district level by introducing a random district effect (Gelman and Hill, 2007). I hypothesise that the nature of the electoral campaign explains this interaction effect. For CR, this implies that the sign of the total effect of district magnitude in open list systems depends on the relative strength of these two channels (H2 and more noise from increased individual vote appeals) and is a priori ambiguous. However, as district magnitude increases, the probability of not identifying a single name correctly declines steeply in closed list systems only. The proliferation of parties and candidacies under MM P appears to be linked to the nature of … This article aims to open the black box of personal voting on the voters’ side.

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